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LETTING GO OF A NATIONAL RELIGION: WHY
THE STATE SHOULD RELINQUISH ALL
CONTROL OVER MARRIAGE
Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay
and red, and he placed them on separate continents. And
but for the interference with his arrangement there would be
no cause for such marriages. The fact that he separated the
races shows that he did not intend for the races to mix. 1
-Virginia Trial Court Judge
Many Americans do not want persons who openly engage
in homosexual conduct as partners in their business, as
scoutmasters for their children, as teachers in their
children's schools, or as boarders in their home.
2
-Antonin Scalia, Supreme Court Justice
I believe in the sanctity of marriage, I totally do. [But] I
was in Vegas and it took over me.
3
-Britney Spears, American Pop Star
I. INTRODUCTION
In the 1960s, the overwhelming prejudice against blacks, fueled
by religious sentiments, formed the legal and social barriers that
empowered state governments to enforce anti-miscegenation laws,
denying blacks and whites the right to marry each other. Today,
similar obstacles are in place, but they are targeted at a different
group. Homosexual couples endure prejudice, largely based on
religious animosity, which has prompted the federal government and
most states to deny them the right to marry. Just as the courts
1. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 3 (1967) (quoting opinion of trial court
judge).
2. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
3. Dwight G. Duncan, The Federal Marriage Amendment and Rule by
Judges, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 543, 543 (2004) (quoting Britney Spears'
telephone interview with MTV's Total Request Live) (alteration in original).
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stepped in to correct the injustice of anti-miscegenation laws despite
public resistance and religious extremism woven into the law, so too
must the courts step in, over the protests of traditional thinkers, to
correct the injustice of religious laws that restrict marriage to a man
and a woman.
In 1967, the Supreme Court decided Loving v. Virginia, which
held Virginia's anti-miscegenation statutes to be unconstitutional.4
Not only did the Court find the statutes violated the Fourteenth
Amendment's guarantee of equal protection, it also declared
marriage to be a fundamental right.5 As such, the government has no
authority to restrict an individual's ability to exercise his or her right
to marry.6 In 2003, the Supreme Court decided Lawrence v. Texas,
which held that gay couples have a right to be in an intimate
relationship without state interference.7  In his scathing dissent,
Justice Scalia admonished that Lawrence paved the way for gay
marriage and the destruction of a traditional, moral institution.
8
Because marriage is in fact a moral, i.e., religious, institution
(holy matrimony) and not a mere contractual agreement, the state
should not regulate it. Loving set the course for disestablishing
marriage from the public sphere by way of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The arguments set forth in Loving similarly apply to
same-sex marriage issues. Additionally, an examination of the First
Amendment's free exercise and establishment provisions, buttressed
by Loving, will illustrate why the solution to the gay marriage debate
lies in returning the institution of marriage to the religious entities
from which it came.
Part II of this paper will provide background information on the
movements to achieve state recognition of interracial marriage and
same-sex marriage. Part III will analogize and distinguish the legal
arguments set forth in Loving with the controversy surrounding the
legality of gay marriage according to settled Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence. Part IV will discuss the conflict between marriage
and the religion clauses in the First Amendment, and why
disestablishing marriage from all government control is an
4. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574.
8. Id. at 604-05 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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innovative, yet wholly logical solution to the ongoing debate.
II. THE BUILDING BLOCKS OF SOCIAL PROGRESS
A. Loving and the Beginnings of Unregulated Marriage
In June 1958, Mildred Jeter, a black woman, and Richard
Loving, a white man, were married in Washington, D.C.9 When they
returned to their home in Virginia, they were arrested for violating
Virginia's anti-miscegenation laws and received a sentence of one
year in jail. I0 They brought suit, and in 1967, the Supreme Court
held Virginia's anti-miscegenation statutes unconstitutional on both
equal protection and due process grounds." In so finding, the Court
identified marriage as a fundamental right, "essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men."
12
In Simple Justice,13 Richard Kluger presents a careful, detailed
history of how Thurgood Marshall led the fight to desegregate public
education, which resulted in the Supreme Court's 1954 decision in
Brown v. Board of Education.14  Kluger illustrates how tempers
flared and resistance ensued when the courts forced school districts
to desegregate. Yet thirteen years later when the Court decided
Loving, the case that legalized the "most detestable of all rites-the
joining of a white and a Negro in holy matrimony,"' 5 there was
"barely a murmur of objection in the land."'
16
This is not to suggest, however, that society welcomed inter-
racial relationships. When school desegregation was in its prelim-
9. Loving, 388 U.S. at 2.
10. See id. at 3.
11. Id. at 12 (holding that "[t]here can be no doubt that restricting the
freedom to marry solely because of racial classifications violates the central
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause"). The Court went on to say that
"[m]arriage is one of the 'basic civil rights of man,' fundamental to our very
existence and survival. To deny this fundamental freedom on so unsupportable
a basis as the racial classifications embodied in these statutes ... is surely to
deprive all the State's citizens of liberty without due process of law." Id.
(internal citations omitted).
12. Id.
13. RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1975).
14. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
15. KLUGER, supra note 13, at 751.
16. Id.
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inary stages, intermarriage was an "unmentionable subject."' 7 When
the University of Maryland admitted its first black student, the
Richmond Times-Dispatch emphatically warned that if a black
student were admitted to the University of Virginia, it would be a
giant step closer to miscegenation.' 8  In fact, Thurgood Marshall
chose George McLaurin, a black, sixty-eight year old applicant to the
University of Oklahoma doctoral program, as his test-case plaintiff
"because he was sixty-eight years old and we didn't think he was
going to marry or intermarry."'19 Marshall believed that completely
bypassing the issue of miscegenation was necessary to help
overcome one of the many hurdles built by the segregationist
Dixicrats. At trial, attorneys for the state of Virginia argued against
desegregating schools, fearful of a slippery slope leading to the
repeal of anti-miscegenation statutes.2 1 Clearly, throughout the civil
rights movement, the public sentiment regarding interracial
relationships was contemptuous.
Nevertheless, since the decision in Loving, the number of
interracial couples has increased significantly. "[T]he number of
black-white couples jumped 150 percent in the 1970s. ' '22 According
to the U.S. Census, in 1970, there were 181,000 black-white
marriages and 310,000 interracial marriages of other racial groups.
23
Between 1970 and 1991, the number of black-white marriages more
than tripled.24 Between 1960 and 1998, the number of interracial
17. Id. at 98.
18. See id. at 195.
19. Id. at 266 (quoting Thurgood Marshall). McLaurin v. Oklahoma State
Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950), along with Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629
(1950), were two preliminary "test" cases before Brown that were designed to
lay the foundation for desegregating all public schools. See George Paul, John
Frank and the "Law Professors'Brief', 35 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 241, 252-53 (2003).
20. See KLUGER, supra note 13, at 266.
21. See id. at 491.
22. Jeff Kunerth, U.S. Laws, Social Taboos Unkind to Mixed Couples,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Jan. 14, 1990, at A10.
23. Itabari Njeri, Faith, Hope and Racial Disparity: As Multicultural
Marriages Increase, Churches Confront a Call for Greater Sensitivity,
Support, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1989, pt. VI (View), at 1, available at 1989 WL
2259741.
24. See Isabel Wilkerson, Black-White Marriages Rise, but Couples Still
Face Scorn, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1991, at Al, available at 1991 WLNR
3051516.
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couples increased tenfold, exceeding 1.6 million.
25
Sociologists suggest two reasons for the increase: first,
interracial marriages became more accepted during the 1970s, and
second, blacks advanced both socially and economically through the
'70s and '80s.26 In 2000, the racial composition of the country had
evolved so much that the U.S. Census adopted a new system of racial
classification to reflect the reality that a substantial portion of the
population has a multi-racial background.27
Despite the growing numbers, broad public acceptance of inter-
racial marriages, especially black-white relationships, is still lacking.
"It has not passed the 'no blink' test," according to Dr. Tom W.
Smith, a researcher at the University of Chicago's National Opinion
Research Center.28 In fact, in a public opinion poll conducted in
1991, one in five whites believed interracial marriage should still be
illegal, as compared to two in five whites asked in 1972.29 In 1991,
sixty-six percent of white Americans said they would oppose a close
relative marrying a black person.30 Some black-white couples have
never told their parents they were married with children, even after
decades of marriage. 31 Blacks seem to be less concerned, however.
Almost two-thirds surveyed neither favor nor oppose a relative
marrying someone non-black.32
A 1990 article in the Orlando Sentinel quotes a Georgia resident
25. Michael A. Fletcher, Interracial Marriages Eroding Barriers, WASH.
POST, Dec. 28, 1998, at A 1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-srv/national/daily/dec98/melt29.htm.
26. Kunerth, supra note 22.
27. See U.S. Census Bureau, Glossary, http://factfmder.census.gov/home/
en/epss/glossaryr.html (defining "race" for Census 2000) (last visited Apr. 16,
2005); Fletcher, supra note 25.
28. Wilkerson, supra note 24 (quoting Dr. Smith).
29. Id.
30. Frank Rich, To Have and to Hold? Like It or Not, Culture Is More
Accepting of Gays, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Aug. 10, 2003, at 1J, available
at 2003 WL 58648836.
31. See, e.g., Wilkerson, supra note 24. Wilkerson tells the story of Teresa
Johnson, a white woman, married to a black man for seventeen years. The
couple has two children, although Teresa never told her parents she was
pregnant with her second child after their reaction to news of the first child.
Teresa goes by her maiden name; her friends and family believe she is single.
Teresa will not go to a family wedding or funeral, for fear of someone asking
her about her personal life. Id.
32. See id.
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who distributes flyers to spread his message that interracial couples
are the "ultimate abomination." 33 He believes that "[r]ace mixing is
a form of lunacy. Folks who believe in race mixing are suffering
from insanity." 34  In 1992, the volunteer coordinator for Patrick
Buchanan's presidential campaign likened "mixed marriages to the
cross-breeding of animals." Thus, "[a]lthough the civil rights
movement and integration erased many of the physical and legal
boundaries dividing the races in this country, race relations in
America remain strained at best. An undercurrent of bigotry per-
vades the nation.... ."36
All of these facts suggest that the Supreme Court's decision was
necessary to protect an individual's right to marry, since most of the
segregationists despised and feared miscegenation around the time of
Loving, and especially since interracial couples have yet to become
the accepted social norm. The decision was essential to enable
hundreds of thousands of relationships to be legally acknowledged.
B. Lawrence Awakens the Gay Political Agenda
In Lawrence, Harris County police officers reported to a private
residence to investigate a weapons disturbance complaint.37 Upon
entering, the officers observed John Lawrence, a resident of the
property, engaged in a sexual act with another man, Tyron Garner.
3 8
The two were arrested, charged, and convicted of "deviate sexual
intercourse, namely anal sex, with a member of the same sex
(man).",39 Writing for the six-member majority, Justice Kennedy
invalidated the Texas statute, finding it violated the defendants'
substantive due process rights.4 °
In reaching its decision, the Court made it clear that its
33. Kunerth, supra note 22 (quoting J.B. Stoner of Marietta, Georgia).
34. Id. (quoting J.B. Stoner of Marietta, Georgia).
35. Fletcher, supra note 25. The coordinator was fired soon after. Id.
36. Karen M. Thomas, Mixed Metaphor: An Increase in Interracial
Couples Is Symbolic of the Nation's Growing Diversity, People of All Races,
Meeting, Socializing and Forming Relationships, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Mar. 23, 1993, at 1C, available at 1993 WL 8792093.
37. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).
38. Id. at 562-63.
39. Id. at 563.
40. Id. at 572 (holding "liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons
in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex").
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"obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate [its] own
moral code. ' 41  Additionally, the Court adopted Justice Stevens'
dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick,42 which stressed "the fact that the
governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular
practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law
prohibiting the practice; neither history nor tradition could save a law
prohibiting miscegenation from constitutional attack., 43 This
reference is particularly telling. The Lawrence Court adopted an
analogy to Loving as a means of supporting its holding: irrespective
of the context of the social attitudes of that era, anti-miscegenation
statutes deprived individuals of liberty to marry in the same way that
the Texas statutes unlawfully deprived individuals of their right to
sexual intimacy. Many view Lawrence to be as important and
revolutionary as Brown since it arguably lays the foundation for gay
marriage.44
Harvard law professor Laurence Tribe writes that "Lawrence is
a story. . . of shifting societal attitudes toward homosexuality, sex,
and gender."4 5 Does this mean that the public is ready to accept gays
into the mainstream? Looking at the eleven states that, in the 2004
41. Id. at 571 (quoting Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 850 (1992)).
42. 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (upholding on similar facts the Georgia anti-
sodomy statute as a rational exercise of state police power, and narrowly
defining the right at issue as the right to engage in homosexual sodomy),
overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
43. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577-78 (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 216
(Stevens, J., dissenting)).
44. For opinions on how Lawrence is the modem-day Brown, see Laurence
H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The "Fundamental Right" That Dare Not Speak
Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1895 (2004); Nancy Gibbs, A Yea for
Gays: The Supreme Court Scraps Sodomy Laws, Setting Off a Hot Debate,
TIME, July 7, 2003, at 38; Evan Thomas, The War over Gay Marriage,
NEWSWEEK, July 7, 2003, at 40. For discussions on how gay marriage is the
logical consequence of Lawrence, see Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 605 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (observing that after the majority opinion in Lawrence, "what
justification could there possibly be for denying the benefits of marriage to
homosexual couples exercising 'the liberty protected by the Constitution?'...
This case 'does not involve' the issue of homosexual marriage only if one
entertains the belief that principle and logic have nothing to do with the
decisions of this Court.") (internal citations omitted); Duncan, supra note 3, at
559.
45. Tribe, supra note 44, at 1896.
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election, amended their state constitutions to ban gay marriage, 46 it
does not seem as though acceptance is universal. A Hawaii
newspaper reports that "[t]he battle for acceptance and equal rights
for gays isn't over by a long shot.' '47 The article goes on to say that
"[m]any Americans still consider homosexuality to be immoral and a
form of mental illness. 'A8  Nevertheless, gays have become
increasingly visible in American culture since the Supreme Court's
decision in Bowers. Tribe suggests that homosexuals have "gained
greater social acceptance 'A9 as they have become involved in politics
and public life in reaction to Bowers.
5 0
Public opinion polls suggest that acceptance of homosexual
rights are slowly on the rise, though most Americans still do not
favor gay marriage. In a CBS News/New York Times Poll
conducted on July 11-15, 2004, 28% of Americans surveyed felt that
gay couples should be allowed to legally marry and 31% of
Americans supported civil unions, while 38% of Americans thought
there should be no legal recognition of a gay couple's relationship.
5 '
The same poll conducted in March 2004 revealed that only 22% of
those surveyed felt that gay couples should have the right to marry,
46. Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Utah. See Same-sex Marriage Bans
Winning on State Ballots (Nov. 3, 2004), at http://www.cnn.com/2004/
ALLPOLITICS/1 1/02/ballot.samesex.marriage. The Human Rights Campaign
website reports that forty-three states have laws or state constitutional
amendments that ban same-sex marriage. The states that do not are
Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
Rhode Island, and the District of Columbia. See Human Rights Campaign,
Marriage/Relationship Laws: State by State, http://www.hrc.orgiTemplate.
cfm?Section=Center&Template=iTaggedPage/TaggedPageDisplay.cfm&TPLI
D=63&ContentlD= 17353 (last updated Jan. 6, 2005).
47. David Orgon Coolidge, Playing the Loving Card: Same-Sex Marriage
and the Politics of Analogy, 12 BYU J. PUB. L. 201, 211 (1998) (quoting Gay
Marriage Decision Is a Civil Rights Victory, HONOLULU STAR-BULL., May 31,
1993 at A8).
48. Id. (quoting Gay Marriage Decision Is a Civil Rights Victory, supra
note 47).
49. Tribe, supra note 44, at 1901 n.28 (quoting Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale,
530 U.S. 640, 660 (2000)).
50. Id. (citing Sonia Katyal, Exporting Identity, 14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM
97, 108 (2002)).
51. CBS News/New York Times Poll, July 11-15, 2004 (N=955 adults
nationwide) (MoE +/- 3 (total sample)), http://pollingreport.com/civil.htm (last
visited Sept. 8, 2004).
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33% favored civil unions, and 40% opposed any form of legal
legitimacy for gays.12 In a CNN/USA Today/Gallup Poll conducted
in March of 1996, 68% of Americans were against conferring rights
of traditional marriage to homosexuals.
5 3
Still, seventeen states have already amended their state
constitutions to prohibit same-sex marriage,5 4 and more states are
contemplating the idea.55 President Bush favors an amendment to
the federal Constitution that would ban gay marriage but provide for
civil unions for same-sex couples.
56
Nevertheless, gay rights advocates hope that more courts soon
come to the same conclusion that the Massachusetts Supreme Court
reached in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health.
5 7
C. Goodridge: An Addition to Loving's Progeny
and a Civil Rights Victory
In Goodridge, the Massachusetts Supreme Court held that the
Commonwealth's policy of denying marriage licenses to homo-
sexuals violated the due process and equal protection provisions in
-the Massachusetts Constitution.58 The court redefined civil marriage
to mean "the voluntary union of two persons as spouses, to the
exclusion of all others." 59 In reaching its decision, the court relied
52. Id.
53. CNN/USA Today/Gallup Poll, Mar. 5-7, 2004 (N=1005 adults
nationwide) (MoE +/- 3), http://pollingreport.com/civil.htm (last visited Sept.
8, 2004).
54. Alaska, Arkansas, Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, Louisiana (pending legal
challenge), Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Utah. See, Human Rights
Campaign, Proposed State Constitutional Amendments Limiting Marriage in
2004, http://www.hrc.org/Template.cfm? Section=Center&CONTENT ID = 2 12
64&TEMPLATE=ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfn (Nov. 3, 2004)
[hereinafter Proposed Amendments]; Massachusetts May Allow Same-sex
Marriages, but Most States Will Not Recognize Them, THE ADvOCATE, Mar.
16, 2004, at 43.
55. In Massachusetts, Tennessee, and Wisconsin, the state legislatures have
passed proposals, but they must be re-approved. See Proposed Amendments,
supra note 54.
56. See Bush Calls for Ban on Same-Sex Marriages (Feb. 25, 2004), http:
//www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/2/24/elec4.prez.bush.marriage/index.
html.
57. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). See discussion infra Part II.C.
58. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 959-62.
59. Id. at 969.
LOYOLA OFLOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol. 38:2185
on the truism asserted in Perez v. Sharp,60 a California anti-
miscegenation case, and Loving: "the right to marry means little if it
does not include the right to marry the person of one's choice."
61
The Department of Health criticized the analogy between Loving
and gay marriage, arguing that Loving came out the way it did
because states had already begun to realize that anti-miscegenation
laws were unconstitutional. 62 The court responded to these chal-
lenges by pointing out that when the California Supreme Court
decided Perez, racial discrimination was still widespread.63 The
Brown mandate to desegregate public schools was still on the distant
horizon, and Plessy v. Ferguson's doctrine of "separate but equal"
was still good law.64 Nevertheless,
[t]he lack of popular consensus favoring integration
(including interracial marriage) did not deter the Supreme
Court of California from holding that that State's anti-
miscegenation statute violated the plaintiffs' constitutional
rights. Neither the Perez court nor the Loving Court was
content to permit an unconstitutional situation to fester
because the remedy might not reflect a broad social
consensus.
65
Similarly, the Massachusetts court could not allow "broad social
consensus" to permit the denial of fundamental rights to
homosexuals.
The main question coming out of Goodridge is whether the U.S.
Supreme Court, when ultimately faced with the issue, will adopt this
rationale. Due to the similarities between interracial marriage and
60. 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948) (holding California's anti-miscegenation
statute to be unconstitutional). The California Supreme Court's decision in
Perez was the first time any state had recognized the legality of interracial
marriages and set the course for the Supreme Court to decide Loving in 1967.
See Keith E. Sealing, Blood Will Tell: Scientific Racism and the Legal Pro-
hibitions Against Miscegenation, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 559, 601 (2000).
61. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 958.
62. See id. at 958 n.16. In Loving, the Court noted that Virginia was one of
only sixteen states that still prohibited marriages on the basis of race. It also
pointed out that in the fifteen years prior to Loving, fourteen states had
repealed laws prohibiting interracial marriages. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.
1, 6 n.5 (1967).
63. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 958 n.16.
64. See id.
65. Id.
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same-sex marriage in the context of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is
a possibility. However, there is another connection between the two
marriage movements that courts have shied away from in reaching
their decisions-one that holds promise for gay couples seeking to
marry: religion.66 Before discussing the religious implications in the
context of gay marriages, the Fourteenth Amendment issues that the
Court discussed in Loving must first be addressed.
III. THE CONNECTION BETWEEN LOVING AND SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
A straightforward statement of the analogy between Loving and
same-sex marriage is as follows: "Just as you should be able to
marry the person you love regardless of race. . . you should be able
to marry the person you love regardless of sex or sexual
orientation." 67  This analogy can be expanded even further by
looking at how the law has developed. When the Supreme Court
decided in Brown that segregated schools were unequal, it rejected
the idea that there was an inherent difference between blacks and
whites.68 While Brown specifically addressed segregation in five
school districts, the decision served as precedent for subsequent
opinions that invalidated discrimination in school districts across the
United States.69 Brown also opened the door for attacks on Jim
Crow laws and provided the basis for invalidating an entire system of
institutionalized racism. After Brown, it was only a matter of time
(thirteen years, to be exact) until racial discrimination would become
sufficiently taboo (legally as well as socially) that the state would be
forced to eliminate its discriminatory practices in the area of
marriage. 71 Thus, in 1967, the Court decided Loving and held that
66. See discussion infra Part IV.
67. Duncan, supra note 3, at 546 (citing Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrim-
ination Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 197, 284 (1994) ("Just as interracial couples cannot be made to suffer any
legal disadvantage that same-race couples are spared, gay couples cannot be
made to suffer any legal disadvantages that heterosexual couples are spared.
Lesbians and gay men must be permitted to marry.")).
68. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954) (overruling
the separate-but-equal doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)).
69. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
70. For a historical study from before Brown until the present, see JAMES T.
PATTERSON, BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION: A CIvIL RIGHTS MILESTONE
AND ITS TROUBLED LEGACY (2001).
71. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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the government could not use race to regulate who marries whom 7 2
In the context of same-sex marriage, Lawrence can be said to
serve the same purpose as Brown. Lawrence sweeps away the idea
that same-sex intimacy is less deserving of constitutional protection
than heterosexual intimacy. Lawrence can be used as a basis for
extending rights to gay people in the same way that Brown shifted
the paradigm away from racial discrimination and towards a more
egalitarian society. Just as Loving was the natural consequence of
Brown, so too could same-sex marriage be the natural consequence
of Lawrence.
73
A. Applying the Fourteenth Amendment to the Analogy
In applying the Court's rationale in Loving to gay marriage,
there are three possible approaches to arguments in favor of gay
marriage: substantive due process, equal protection based on a
classification, and equal protection based on a fundamental right.
1. Substantive Due Process
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[n]o state shall.
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law." 74  In Loving, the Court determined that marriage is a
fundamental right and thus warrants protection by the Fourteenth
Amendment. 75 Because Virginia infringed on that right by forbid-
ding people of different races from marrying, the Court struck down
the law as unconstitutional.76
Similarly, in the case of gay marriage, the right at issue is
marriage. The right is fundamental.77 Thus, any law impinging on
72. Id. at 12.
73. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 604-05 (2003) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass.
2003).
74. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
75. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
76. Id.
77. Substantive due process cases following Loving have consistently
affirmed marriage to be a fundamental right. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558, 574 (2003) ("[Our laws and tradition afford constitutional protection to
personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family
relationships, child rearing, and education."); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702, 726 (1997); Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
847-48 (1992) ("Marriage is ... an aspect of liberty protected against state
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that right would be subject to strict scrutiny.78 In other words, the
state must justify its actions with a compelling interest.
In People v. Greenleaf 9 and Goodridge, the respective states
attempted to justify their acts by asserting an interest in
procreation. 80 This argument, however, fails. 81 The state does not
otherwise require heterosexual couples to prove they will procreate
before issuing marriage licenses.82 Moreover, the right to prevent
pregnancy by using contraception is fundamental.83 So too is the
right to choose to have an abortion. 84 If a state cannot interfere with
a person's right to procreate, then it cannot rely on procreation as
justification for banning same-sex marriage.
Additionally, a government's interest in inculcating society with
its own moral code is not compelling. 85 In Romer v. Evans8 6 and
Lawrence, the Court held that the state did not even have a legitimate
interest in infringing on rights of gay individuals. 87 It is doubtful that
a state would be able to satisfy the more stringent compelling interest
requirement here. Thus, it is unlikely that a state will be able to
interference by the substantive component of the Due Process Clause....");
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (observing that the fundamental
right to privacy extends to "activities relating to marriage, procreation,
contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and education" (internal
citations omitted)).
78. Strict scrutiny requires that a state's restriction on the right must further
a compelling state interest using the least restrictive means. See ALLAN IDES &
CHRISTOPHER N. MAY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 76 (3d ed.
2004).
79. 780 N.Y.S.2d 899 (2004).
80. Id. at 901; Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 961
(Mass. 2003).
81. See Greenleaf, 780 N.Y.S.2d at 903; Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 961-62.
82. See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 961 ("Our laws of civil marriage...
contain[] no requirement that the applicants for a marriage license attest to
their ability or intention to conceive children by coitus. Fertility is not a
condition of marriage... ."); David B. Cruz, Disestablishing Sex and Gender,
90 CAL. L. REV. 997, 1079 (2002) ("[N]o one in the United States is required
to procreate, or even to be capable of procreation, to marry.").
83. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
84. See Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973).
85. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 850.
86. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
87. Id. at 634; Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
2197
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAWREVIEW [Vol. 38:2185
justify its infringement on the exercise of a fundamental right.
The argument could be made that the right at issue is not
marriage, but rather gay marriage. By defining the right at issue
narrowly, the right may not be classified as fundamental since gay
marriage is not "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition."88 Although the Court could technically take this route to
justify a state's actions, doing so would put restrictions on a
fundamental right-something a state cannot do.
Nevertheless, if the Court were to adopt this narrow definition,
the law would only be subject to a rational basis review. This means
that the state must have a legitimate interest in passing laws banning
gay marriage, and the means must be rationally related to achieving
that interest. Even under a rational basis test, however, the Court
might not be as deferential to the state legislature in situations where
politically unpopular groups are targeted, as compared to other
situations that fall within the state's police power.89 As was the case
in Loving, it is likely that laws banning gay marriage could be
invalidated on substantive due process grounds under either strict
scrutiny or rational basis review.
2. Equal Protection Based on a Classification
In Loving, the Court also invalidated Virginia's anti-
miscegenation statute on equal protection grounds. The Court held,
"There is patently no legitimate overriding purpose independent of
individious racial discrimination which justifies this classification."
90
The Court went on to say that "[t]here can be no doubt that
restricting the freedom to marry solely because of racial classi-
fications violates the central meaning of the Equal Protection
Clause."'
88. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997).
89. Compare Romer, 517 U.S. 620 (using rational basis review to invalidate
a state amendment that burdened rights of gays only), Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558
(using rational basis review to invalidate a Texas statute banning sexual
intimacy for homosexuals), and City of Cleburne v. Clebume Living Ctr., Inc.,
473 U.S. 432 (1985) (using rational basis review to invalidate a statute
discriminating against the mentally ill), with City of New Orleans v. Dukes,
427 U.S. 297 (1976) (upholding an ordinance that prohibited any vendors from
selling products in New Orleans' French Quarter unless the vendors had been
in business for more than eight years).
90. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
91. Id. at 12.
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In the case of gay marriage, sexuality is the classifying trait.
The law permits heterosexual couples to marry but not homosexual
couples. Although classifications on the basis of race trigger strict
scrutiny,92 classifications based on sexuality do not.93 Moreover, the
Court has not named gays a quasi-suspect class, worthy of mid-level
scrutiny.
94
Theoretically, gays could fall into either of these categories
because they share characteristics consistent with other groups
receiving heightened scrutiny. These characteristics are as follows:
(1) members of the class share an immutable trait; (2) there is a
history of discrimination against members of the class; 96 (3) the
group is politically powerless; 97 and (4) the characteristic has no
bearing on one's ability to perform. 98 Nevertheless, the Court has
been unwilling to expand the categories of protected classes.99 Thus,
the Court would afford the discrimination against same-sex couples
only a rational basis review. Again, the Court might apply rational
basis more stringently, as it did in Romer, Lawrence, and
Cleburne,00 but the Court could also choose to apply the tradition-
ally deferential strand of the test as well.
Rather than identifying sexuality as the classifying trait, gender
could be the identifiable criteria. In Loving, antimiscegenation
statutes were unconstitutional because the state had used race as the
criterion for determining who could marry whom. Similarly, with
92. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) ("[A]ll legal
restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are
immediately suspect. . . . [C]ourts must subject them to the most rigid
scrutiny.").
93. Race, national origin, and alienage (when states discriminate) are the
only classifications that receive heightened scrutiny. See City of Cleburne, 473
U.S. at 440-41.
94. The Court has found that gender and legitimacy are quasi-suspect
classes and receive mid-level scrutiny once a prima facie case has been
established. See IDES & MAY, supra note 78, at 241, 251-52.
95. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 360-61 (1978).
96. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
97. See supra notes 46, 54-55 and accompanying text.
98. See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 471-73 (laying out characteristics for
heightened scrutiny).
99. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (using rational basis to
attack discrimination against gays); City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 471-73
(using rational basis test to attack discrimination against the mentally ill).
100. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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respect to gay marriage, the state is using gender as the criterion for
determining who may marry whom.
The Court has consistently held gender to be a quasi-suspect
class, 1 1 which receives heightened scrutiny under a substantial
relationship test. This means that "[p]arties who seek to defend
gender-based government action must demonstrate an 'exceedingly
persuasive justification' for that action."' 1 2 Further, a "State must
show 'at least that the [challenged] classification serves 'important
governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means
employed' are 'substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives." The justification must be genuine, not hypothesized or
invented post hoc."' 0 3 Lastly, the classification "must not rely on
overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or
preferences of males and females."'
1 4
This test is much closer to strict scrutiny than to rational basis.
Thus, if Courts view laws banning gay marriage as discriminatory on
the basis of gender, the laws will have a difficult time withstanding
the Court's rigid scrutiny.
3. Equal Protection Based on
the Provision of a Fundamental Right
The Fourteenth Amendment provides a third approach for
attacking laws that ban gay marriage. This third means is a
combination of the first two: an equal protection argument based on
the state's discrimination in its provision of a fundamental right,
rather than discrimination based on a character trait.105 Under this
theory, a state cannot deny one group a fundamental right when it
does not infringe on other groups' opportunities to exercise that same
right.
101. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996); Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
102. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531 (quoting J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel T.B., 511
U.S. 127, 136-37 (1994) and Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718,
724 (1982)).
103. Id. at 533 (quoting Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142,
150 (1980)) (internal citation omitted) (alteration in original).
104. Id.
105. See, e.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 649 (1982) (finding an equal
protection violation in the government's provision of the fundamental right to
vote).
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As in the substantive due process analysis, the fundamental right
at issue is marriage. By banning marriage for same-sex couples
only, the state denies an identifiable group--homosexuals-the right
to exercise a fundamental right, while properly remaining uninvolved
when heterosexuals seek to enter into marriage. Such an unequal
deprivation of a fundamental liberty interest would trigger strict
scrutiny and likely thwart state efforts to ban gay marriage.
Each of these approaches is theoretical and counter-arguments
exist. Some might argue that the Fourteenth Amendment's purpose
is to remedy racial discrimination and nothing more. Thus, the
argument goes, discrimination based on a person's sexuality falls
completely outside the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment.
This argument, however, is a bit outdated. Reaching beyond mere
racial discrimination, the Fourteenth Amendment has been used to
incorporate most of the Bill of Rights to be enforceable as against the
states. 10 6 The Fourteenth Amendment also provides remedies for
discrimination on the basis of alienage,' 7 national origin,'
gender, 0 9 legitimacy, 110 voting discrimination,' 11 and discrimination
involving the right to travel."l 2  Thus, limiting the Fourteenth
Amendment to racial discrimination would illogically contradict the
evolution of equal protection jurisprudence.
While comparisons to Loving, guided by the Fourteenth
Amendment, provide valuable tools to the same-sex marriage
advocate, there is another, more nuanced solution to the debate: the
First Amendment.
IV. SEVERING MARRIAGE FROM STATE CONTROL:
FROM LOVING TO GAY MARRIAGE
Religious views shaped public opinion in 1967 when the Court
106. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-26 (1937). Through the
Fourteenth Amendment, the First, Fourth, Fifth (except for the requirement of
a grand jury indictment in criminal prosecutions), Sixth, and Eighth (only the
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment) Amendments now apply to the
states. Id. at 323-24.
107. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
108. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
109. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
110. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988).
111. See Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289 (1975).
112. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
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decided Loving, and they are relevant today in the controversy
surrounding gay marriage. An examination of this social force will
further illustrate why the Loving/gay marriage analogy holds true and
why the Supreme Court should continue what Loving started by
altogether removing government from marriage.
A. Religious Sentiments
Religion has been used to support both sides of the interracial
marriage and same-sex marriage controversies. On the one hand,
traditional values render the "daring" relationships immoral and
"against God."' 1 3 Therefore, morality dictates that the illicit liaisons
cannot be condoned by God or by the state. 1 14 On the other hand,
when the government restricts a religious leader's ability to sanctify
a marriage-a sacred religious event-the state effectively infringes
on a person's First Amendment right to free exercise of religion and,
at the same time, violates the Establishment Clause. These
arguments were set forth when Loving was litigated, and they are
likewise present in the gay rights debate.
1. Religion and Interracial Marriage
When the Supreme Court was deciding Loving, a number of
bishops joined together with the National Catholic Conference for
Interracial Justice and the National Catholic Social Action
Conference to submit an amicus brief, urging the Court to declare
Virginia's anti-miscegenation statutes unconstitutional." 5 The brief
argued that the Virginia laws restricted the free exercise of religion
guaranteed by the First Amendment. 116 The bishops contended that
"[r]eligion does not encompass belief alone; it involves action. And
in wise recognition of this fact, the Constitution. . . 'safeguards the
free exercise of the chosen form of religion."'
117
Because "[m]arriage is a fundamental act of religion," it should
fall within the protection of the First Amendment." 8 In Catholicism,
113. See Cruz, supra note 82, at 1012.
114. See id. at 1013.
115. Brief of Amicus Curiae John J. Russell, Bishop of Richmond et al.,
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (No. 395), 1967 WL 93613.
116. Id. at *6-*7.
117. Id. (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 301 U.S. 296, 303 (1940)).
118. Id. at *7.
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marriage is a sacrament-a "divine bestowal of salvation in an
outwardly perceptible form which makes the bestowal 
manifest."'1 19
In Judaism, marriage is "a sanctification encompassing an entire
philosophy and way of life."'120 According to Episcopalian tradition,
"no member of the Church shall be excluded from the sacraments of
the Church because of race, color, or ethnic origin."'121 Similarly, the
Evanston Assembly preached that segregation is "contrary to the
Gospel, and is incompatible with the Christian doctrine .. ,122
Thus, according to the bishops, the state has no business infringing
on their right to practice their religion as they see fit.
The Virginia trial court judge took an opposing view to those
advocating free religious exercise. The trial judge upheld Virginia's
anti-miscegenation statutes based on the belief that God put different
races on different continents for a reason-so that they would not
mix. 12  "And but for the interference with his arrangement there
would be no cause for such marriages."'
124
Although Loving did not specifically address the bishops' free
exercise arguments, the Court did quote the trial judge's statement of
God's "intentions," thus creating a powerful juxtaposition that nicely
illustrates just how baseless the Virginia laws really were. Perhaps
in the context of gay marriage, the Supreme Court could similarly
ferret out the bigotry and discrimination that are being shielded by
religious beliefs.
2. Religion and Same-Sex Marriage
Building on the same arguments propounded in the Loving
amicus brief, proponents of gay marriage assert that free religious
exercise supports their cause. In New York, police arrested two
Unitarian Universalist Church ministers for performing marriage
119. Id. at *9 (quoting EDWARD SCHILLEBEECKX, CHRIST THE SACRAMENT
OF THE ENCOUNTER WITH GOD 15 (1963)).
120. Id. at *10 (quoting PHILIP GOODMAN & HANNA GOODMAN, THE JEW-
ISH MARRIAGE ANTHOLOGY viii (1965)).
121. Id. at*11.
122. Id. (quoting EDWARD DUFF, THE SOCIAL THOUGHT OF THE WORLD
COUNCIL OF CHURCHES 243 (1956)).
123. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 3 (1967).
124. Id. (quoting opinion of the trial judge); see also Scott v. State, 39 Ga.
321, 326 (1869) (condoning anti-miscegenation statutes because "[t]he God of
nature made it otherwise"), quoted in People v. Greenleaf, 780 N.Y.S. 2d 899,
902 (2004).
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ceremonies for thirteen gay couples without a marriage license.12 5
The ministers defended their acts on the grounds that New York's
ban on gay marriage infringed on their free exercise of religion.126 In
a debate over a federal constitutional amendment that would ban gay
marriages, Senator Ted Kennedy argued that "[flar from upholding
religious freedom, the proposed amendment would undermine it by
telling churches they can't consecrate same-sex marriages."' 127 The
Episcopal Church has already sanctioned same-sex marriages.1
2 8
The Reform Jewish Movement has done the same. In a press
conference concerning the Federal Marriage Amendment, Rabbi
Michael Namath of the Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism
said the following:
The Reform Jewish Movement ... is a longtime supporter
of equal rights for gay men and lesbians, including full civil
marriage equality. . . .We do not believe that homo-
sexuality is a sin. Judaism teaches that the family serves as
the fundamental institution of society-families rooted in
love between two committed, caring adults-and families
devoted to raising children in a loving, supportive
environment.
Civil marriage must be differentiated from religious
marriage-because religious marriage is an institution and a
religious concept that must remain the domain of religion,
but civil marriage is a set of legal protections and benefits
that the government grants based on the possession of a
civil marriage license. We do not believe that all religions
should have to recognize same-sex religious marriage, but
we do believe that the government must give equal
protection to all its citizens and equal respect to all its
religions. 1
29
125. See Greenleaf, 780 N.Y.S.2d at 900.
126. See id. at 902-03.
127. Michael J. McManus, Save Marriage in Court ... or Constitution?,
WASH. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2003, at A21 (quoting Sen. Ted Kennedy), available
at 2003 WL 7719809.
128. Id.
129. Rabbi Michael Namath, Statement at a Press Conference Concerning
the Federal Marriage Amendment on Capitol Hill, Washington, D.C. (Mar. 3,
2004), http://rac.org/news/030304.html.
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Opponents of gay marriage also rely on religion to make their
case. After the Massachusetts Supreme Court decided Goodridge,
President Bush made the following statement: "Marriage is a sacred
institution between a man and a woman. Today's decision of the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court violates this important
principle. I will work with congressional leaders and others to do
what is legally necessary to defend the sanctity of marriage."
130
"Sacred" is defined in the Merriam-Webster OnLine Dictionary as
"la: dedicated or set apart for the service or worship of a deity...
2a: worthy of religious veneration... 3: of or relating to religion: not
secular or profane." 131 Because President Bush frequently refers to
marriage as "sacred," it appears as though he is using his religious
beliefs to justify homosexuals' exclusion from rights to a civil
marriage.
With twenty-nine religious and political organizations as
sponsors, President Bush declared the week of October 12-18, 2003
as "Marriage Protection Week."' 132 One of the sponsors, the
American Family Association, said this about homosexuals' place in
society:
What Would Jesus Do? Jesus never "tolerated" or
"accepted" sin. While His response to sin was swift and
sometimes harsh, His motive was always one of
unconditional love. Jesus didn't "pussy foot" around,
fearful He may "offend" someone or worried He may
appear "hate-filled," "intolerant" or "bigoted." No, Jesus
called it like it was: sin is sin is sin. . . .It's high time
Christians ... did the same.
13 3
130. JASON CIANCIoTro & RODDRICK COLVIN, THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION
ON MARRIAGE EQUALITY FOR SAME-SEX COUPLES (2004) (emphasis added)
(quoting George W. Bush, Statement Concerning the Massachusetts Court's
Decision in Goodridge, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/11/
20031118-4.html (Nov. 18, 2003)), at http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/
Election2004Archive/BushCheneyMarriage.pdf.
131. MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE, http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary?
book=-Dictionary&va=sacred (last visited Mar. 27, 2005).
132. See Sean Cahill et al., "Marriage Protection Week" Sponsors: Are They
Really Interested in "Building Strong and Healthy Marriages? ", Policy Brief,
Nat'l Gay and Lesbian Task Force Policy Inst. (Oct. 15, 2003), available at
http://www.ngltf.org/downloads/MarriageProtectionWeek.pdf.
133. CIANCIOTTO & COLVIN, supra note 130 (quoting S. Bennett,
Homosexual Agenda: The Deception and Desensitization of America 's Youth,
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As was the case when interracial marriage was on the public
agenda, religious arguments drive both sides of the same-sex
marriage debate. This is where the problem lies. Although the
government has protected civil marriages, marriage, at its core, is a
religious institution. 134  As a result, religious organizations-not
states-should govern religious practices. In fact, government regu-
lation potentially runs afoul of both the Free Exercise Clause and the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Although the Court
did not rely on the First Amendment in reaching its decision, Loving
first articulated the idea that the government cannot regulate whom
one chooses to marry. The First Amendment can carry this idea to
completion by providing a means of completely removing govern-
ment from marriage, thus providing a solution to the ongoing debate.
B. Free Exercise and the Same-Sex Marriage Ban
The First Amendment contains two separate provisions
regarding religion: the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise
Clause. I In Employment Division v. Smith, 136 the Supreme Court
clarified the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause. At issue in Smith
was whether an Oregon law criminalizing the ingestion of peyote
violated the free exercise rights of the defendants, who were
members of the Native American Church and ingested peyote as part
of a religious ceremony. 137 The Court found the law constitutional
because "the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of
the obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general
applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes)
conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes). ' ' ' 138 Thus, the
general rule emerging from Smith is that a law violates the Free
Exercise Clause only when a state intentionally targets and forbids
religiously motivated conduct. 1
39
Am. Family Ass'n (2005), http://www.afa.net/homosexualagenda/get
article.asp?id=81.
134. See supra Part IV.A.l.
135. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .. .
136. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
137. Id. at 874.
138. Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982)
(Stevens, J., concurring)).
139. See id. at 886 n.3.
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1. Implementing Smith in the Case of Gay Marriage
Applying the Smith rule to a ban on same-sex marriage raises a
free exercise problem. Although it is true that there is a distinction
between religious and civil marriage, the distinction is illusory. The
Greenleaf case involved ministers who had been arrested for
performing marriage ceremonies for gay couples without a license.14
0
Even though the court overturned the convictions on other grounds,
it maintained the position that the state--not God-had bestowed the
ministers with the power to officiate over the ceremonies.
14 1
Additionally, President Bush has said that "[m]arriage cannot be
severed from its cultural, religious and natural roots without
weakening the good influence of society."' 142 If courts are asserting
that ministers cannot be free to perform marriage ceremonies that are
acceptable to their religion, and the President of the United States
contends that marriage is inseparable from religion, then how is it
possible that there is any true distinction between civil marriage and
religious marriage? Moreover, although Bush supports a consti-
tutional amendment that would restrict marriage to a man and a
woman, he would support civil unions for same-sex couples. 143 If
the civil unions were to give gay couples rights equivalent to
marriage in effect, though not in name, then how is "marriage" a
civil institution rather than a religious one?
Lawmakers are intentionally targeting the religious conduct.
The specific purpose of Defense of Marriage laws ("DOMAs") and
state constitutional amendments is to ban same-sex marriages.
144
140. People v. Greenleaf, 780 N.Y.S.2d 899, 900 (2004).
141. Id. at 902.
142. Bush Calls for Ban on Same-Sex Marriages, Feb. 25, 2004,
http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/02/24/elecO4.prez.bush.marriage/
index.html [hereinafter CNNArticle] (emphasis added).
143. See id.
144. For example, Alabama's Marriage Protection Act states that
"[m]arriage is a sacred covenant, solemnized between a man and a woman,
which ... establishes their relationship as husband and wife, and which is
recognized by the state as a civil contract. No marriage license shall be issued
in the State of Alabama to parties of the same sex. The State of Alabama shall
not recognize as valid any marriage of parties of the same sex that occurred...
as a result of the law of any jurisdiction. . . ." ALA. CODE § 30-1-19 (2005)
(emphasis added). See also CNN Article, supra note 142 (explaining that the
Defense of Marriage Act "prevents federal recognition of same-sex marriage,
and allows states to ignore same-sex licenses from outside their borders").
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President Bush stated that "[tihe union of a man and a woman is the
most enduring human institution, honored and encouraged in all
cultures and by every religious faith."'145 President Bush, however,
fails to account for the fact that some religions do support the union
of two people of the same sex. The government's targeting and
proscribing such religious activity thus violates the rule set forth in
Smith.
Smith discussed an exception to the general rule where a court
could relax the "intent" element if the state law that hindered the
religious practice also hindered the exercise of some other consti-
tutionally protected right.146 Justice Scalia termed such a situation a
"hybrid," since two fundamental rights-free exercise and some
other right, such as freedom of speech or freedom of the press- 147
would be infringed. 148  However, this "hybrid" exception is theo-
retically suspect. When the government impinges on an individual's
ability to exercise a fundamental right, strict scrutiny is triggered,
period. There is no need for a second fundamental right to be
restricted in order to establish a need for heightened scrutiny. For
example, if a law infringes on an individual's free speech rights as
well as her ability to carry on religiously motivated conduct, there
would be no need to attack the law under a hybrid theory. Instead,
the law could be successfully challenged on freedom of expression
grounds alone. Nevertheless, the "hybrid" scenario remains good
law and could apply to gay marriage since laws banning such
marriages interfere with both the right to free exercise as well as the
fundamental right to marry.1
49
2. Free Exercise in the Courts
Although the free religious exercise argument is a plausible
145. CNNArticle, supra note 142.
146. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 880-82 (1990).
147. Id.
148. In his opinion in Smith, Justice Scalia distinguished Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205 (1972), a case that permitted Amish parents to remove their
children from school before completion of the state-mandated minimum
education. He reasoned that Yoder was a "hybrid situation" rather than a pure,
free exercise case: the state-mandated minimum infringed both the parents'
right to free exercise, as well as their fundamental right to raise and educate
their children as they saw fit. See id. at 881-82.
149. For a discussion of substantive due process, see supra Parts III.A. 1, 3.
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means to afford marital rights to homosexuals, courts thus far have
appeared unwilling to adopt that rationale as a basis for invalidating
statutes banning gay marriage.15 0 In Goodridge, although the court
held that laws banning same-sex marriage were unconstitutional, the
court explained:
Many people hold deep-seated religious, moral, and ethical
convictions that marriage should be limited to the union of
one man and one woman, and that homosexual conduct is
immoral. Many hold equally strong religious, moral, and
ethical convictions that same-sex couples are entitled to be
married, and that homosexual persons should be treated no
differently than their heterosexual neighbors. Neither view
answers the question before us. 1
51
In Greenleaf, the court overturned the ministers' convictions,
holding that the state interest in defining marriage according to
"political, cultural, religious, and legal" traditions was not a
legitimate state interest. 152  The court also rejected the state's
argument that laws restricting marriage to a man and a woman
further the interest in encouraging procreation and child rearing.
53
However, the court refused to overturn the convictions on religious
exercise grounds. 154 The court makes clear the distinction between
religious and civil marriage. 155 It writes, "[s]ince the state has made
an accommodation by permitting clergy to act in the state capacity of
150. See, e.g., People v. Greenleaf, 780 N.Y.S.2d 899, 902 (2004) ("[S]tate
sanctioned marriage is a civil event, not a religious one.").
151. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003).
152. Greenleaf, 780 N.Y.S.2d at 901 (finding that "[t]radition does not
justify unconstitutional treatment. Slavery was also a traditional institution.").
The court goes on to say that "[t]he traditional definition of marriage in some
states excluded interracial marriages," and the Court in Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967), later found that definition to be unconstitutional. Greenleaf,
780 N.Y.S.2d at 901-02.
153. Greenleaf, 780 N.Y.S.2d at 903. In rejecting the state's rationale for
the laws, the court writes, "Citing 'procreation' as a broad justification for
denying marriage to same-sex couples displays an anti-gay bias." Id. Other
married couples "are not required to have children, or even to engage in sexual
relations." Id. Furthermore, gay people can adopt, give birth to, and raise
children themselves. Id. "Prohibiting same-sex couples from marrying
suggests that marriage is about nothing but sex. This is demeaning to all
couples who seek to marry and to the institution of marriage." Id.
154. See id.
155. Id.
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officiating at civil marriage ceremonies, the state does not violate
free exercise of religion by imposing valid restrictions on the ability
to do so."'
156
As discussed above, however, the court's reasoning in Greenleaf
is flawed because it fails to recognize that civil and religious
marriages are inextricably intertwined. In fact, the statement by the
court helps make the case that this is indeed the situation. According
to the court, since the state bestowed upon clergy the power to
officiate over civil marriages, the state-not religious institutions-
retains the sole authority to determine who may take part in religious
marital ceremonies. If the court were to recognize this flaw in its
reasoning, free exercise would be a legitimate challenge to laws
banning same-sex marriage.
C. Marriage and the Establishment Clause
Unlike the Free Exercise Clause, the Establishment Clause lacks
a single definitive test for a law's constitutionality. Instead, a
number of different approaches have emerged.1
5 7
1. The Separationists
A separationist view seeks to maintain Thomas Jefferson's "wall
of separation" between church and state.' 5 8 To determine whether
the wall has broken down, the separationists apply a three-prong test
first articulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman:159 "First, the statute must
have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary
effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally
the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement
with religion."
' 160
Analyzing gay marriage under this test would result in a
156. Id.
157. See Cruz, supra note 82, at 1027 ("Because study of the constitutional
law of religion in the United States is, to understate the case, not a
jurisprudential field suffering from a surfeit of stifling unanimity, there are
numerous scholarly and judicial approaches to disestablishment, each with its
proponents and detractors." (internal citation omitted)).
158. See id. at 1048 ("Strict separationist approaches to the disestablishment
of religion hold that the wall of separation between church and state should be
high and impenetrable.").
159. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
160. Id. at 612-13 (internal citations omitted).
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violation of the Establishment Clause. The first issue is whether a
statute banning gay marriage might have a secular purpose.'
61
Arguably, regulating civil marriage would qualify as a secular
purpose. But, as discussed above, the idea that there is a true
distinction between civil and religious marriage is erroneous. If this
idea were accepted, such a secular rationale would fail. Opponents
of gay marriage have tried to set forth secular justifications for laws
that ban marriage for same-sex couples. 162 University of Southern
California law professor David Cruz argues that "[m]any of these
explanations might reflect partial historical explanations for how or
why marriage became enshrined as a legal status regulated by the
state, but they so poorly fit the actual contours of marriage laws in
the United States today that they cannot be regarded as justifying the
mixed-sex requirement."' 163 Thus, the law would fail the first prong
of the test, indicating that it falls outside of constitutional boundaries.
Additionally, under the second prong, the primary effect of such
a statute would both advance and inhibit religion. This is because a
law banning gay marriage achieves two ends. First, such a law
favors, or "advances," those religions that do not condone same-sex
unions by siding with that particular viewpoint. At the same time,
religions that would gladly solemnize a same-sex marriage but-for
the law are "inhibited." In essence, what the government is doing is
superimposing its religious views about marriage over what should
be secular, contractual rights. As a result, the law would fail the
second prong, and violate the Establishment Clause.
The third prong of "excessive government entanglement''
16
could also lend itself to an Establishment Clause violation.
Excessive entanglement occurs when the government must regularly
oversee the activities of a religious institution.165 In the case of gay
marriage, if the government constantly monitored sectarian organiza-
tions to make sure that no same-sex couples professed their vows,
then this would constitute excessive entanglement. 166 Thus, under
161. Any secular purpose will do; it need not be the primary purpose. See
IDES & MAY, supra note 78, at 409.
162. See Cruz, supra note 82, at 1078.
163. Id. (internal citation omitted).
164. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613.
165. See id. at 614-22.
166. People v. Greenleaf, 780 N.Y.S.2d 899 (2004), is an excellent
illustration of this point.
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the separationist view, laws banning gay marriage violate the
Establishment Clause.
2. The Endorsement Approach
Justice O'Connor "pioneered" the endorsement approach, which
suggests that "government should not appear to embrace religious
beliefs or the proposition that a person's religion is relevant to his or
her standing in the public realm."'167 Banning gay marriage violates
this principle. Professor Cruz writes that "[c]ivil marriage is one of
the last great bastions of resistance to the disestablishment of religion
in the United States."168 When government does not permit same-
sex couples to marry, government endorses, or gives credence to,
those religions that adhere to the belief that only heterosexual
marriage is "sacred" and thus worthy of the state's protection.
Professor Cruz goes on to argue that the American "hysteria"
surrounding gay marriage "is grounded in people's religious beliefs
that marriage means, simply must be, and was instituted by God as[]
a union of one man with one woman."'169 As such, restricting
marriage to heterosexual couples violates the endorsement approach
to the Establishment Clause.
3. The Coercion Test
Justice Kennedy propounded the Establishment Clause's
coercion test in Lee v. Weisman,170 a case that addressed prayer in
public schools. In his opinion, Justice Kennedy wrote that "prayer
exercises in public schools carry a particular risk of indirect
coercion."'' He went on to say that "[t]his pressure, though subtle
and indirect, can be as real as any overt compulsion ... [T]he State
may not, consistent with the Establishment Clause, place primary
167. Cruz, supra note 82, at 1045. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 69-
70 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Lemon's inquiry. . requires courts
to examine whether government's purpose is to endorse religion and whether
the statute actually conveys a message of endorsement.... The endorsement
test ... preclude[s] government from conveying or attempting to convey a
message that religion or a particular religious belief is favored or preferred.").
168. Cruz, supra note 82, at 1078.
169. Id.
170. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
171. Id. at 592.
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and secondary school children in this position."'
172
Coercion is not a readily applicable theory to same-sex
marriage. Coercion, while an arguably viable theory when analyzing
the effects on children forced to pray in a public learning
environment, is not suited to the issues involved in an analysis of
marriage. In fact, "the question of the degree of coercion effectuated
by the offer of mixed-sex civil marriage but not of same-sex
marriage is exceedingly complex and perhaps not well suited to
judicial resolution."' 73 Thus, coercion may be left to school prayer
and need not be examined further in this discussion.
4. The Non-Preferentialist Approach
Under a non-preferentialist view, the government may advance
religion generally without violating the Establishment Clause, so
long as it neither establishes a national or state reliion, nor gives
preferential treatment to one religion over another. Laws pro-
hibiting gay marriage violate this principle. By limiting marriage to
heterosexual couples, the government advances one particular
religious belief about what constitutes marriage. But, in doing so,
the government embraces and enforces one particular strand of
religious thought at the expense of others. Therefore, under a non-
preferentialist approach, government is "singl[ing] out particular
religions for special favor,"'175 which it cannot do.
5. The Trump Card: Tradition
Sometimes tradition can excuse state-sponsored religious
activities. In his dissent in Lee v. Weisman, Justice Scalia argues that
religious invocations at school graduation ceremonies are consti-
tutional because the government has traditionally condoned prayer at
172. Id. at 593.
173. Cruz, supra note 82, at 1039.
174. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 113 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) ("The Framers intended the Establishment Clause to prohibit the
designation of any church as a 'national' one. The Clause was also designed
to stop the Federal Government from asserting a preference for one religious
denomination or sect over others.... [N]othing in the Establishment Clause
requires government to be strictly neutral between religion and irreligion...
. t).175. Cruz, supra note 82, at 1044.
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAWREVIEW [Vol. 38:2185
public ceremonies. 176 While tradition may serve a legitimate
function in certain instances (perhaps maintaining the phrase "In God
We Trust" on the dollar bill), it cannot overpower rights so
fundamental to an individual as marriage. For, if tradition could
trump the First and Fourteenth Amendments, what purpose would
the Constitution serve?
177
D. A Solution to the First Amendment Problems
A plausible, though admittedly quasi-revolutionary, remedy for
these First Amendment violations would be to completely
disestablish the institution of marriage from the civil context. If
marriage were an entirely religious event, religious entities would be
free to marry, or not marry, couples as they saw fit. The government
would be unable to interfere or regulate, for the choice would be left
to the priests, ministers, rabbis, monks, and other clergy retaining the
right to perform the "sacred' (to borrow from President Bush's
vocabulary) ritual.
This remedy actually is not so revolutionary. The idea first
emerged in Loving. By classifying marriage as a fundamental right,
the Court recognized that the government could not regulate
something that is so fundamental to a free society. Since government
is already unable to interfere with an individual's decision to marry,
it makes sense to go one step further and completely remove
marriage from the public sphere.
Setting aside private bias against homosexuals for the moment,
if the ban on gay marriage were challenged in court on substantive
due process grounds, it is hard to see how such a challenge would
fail. 178 As the Court in Loving decreed, the government may not
interfere with any individual's right to marry. 1
79
Building on Loving, the proper solution would simply be to
176. Lee, 505 U.S. at 635 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[C]ongressional sessions
have opened with a chaplain's prayer ever since the First Congress. And this
Court's own sessions have opened with the invocation 'God save the United
States and this Honorable Court' since the days of Chief Justice Marshall."
(internal citation omitted)).
177. See People v. Greenleaf, 780 N.Y.S.2d 899, 901 (2004) ("Tradition
does not justify unconstitutional treatment. Slavery was also a traditional
institution.").
178. See supra Parts III.A.1-3.
179. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
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convert all "civil" marriages (which, as discussed above, are really
religious marriages with civil contractual benefits) into civil unions.
Such an act would leave the legal contractual agreements in place,
unchanged. All that would change would be the name ("marriage" to
"union"). Additionally, homosexual couples could obtain the legal
and financial benefits that civil marriage has always provided-
benefits which, according to well-established Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence, should already have been made available.
Of course, the mere mention of the idea that there would be no
more legally recognized marriage immediately raises questions as to
property rights, parental rights, inheritance rights, evidentiary
privileges, tax benefits, and so on. These questions have already
been answered in the previous few sentences. A civil union would
confer all the benefits and protections that marriage has traditionally
provided, but would not be limited to heterosexual couples.' 80  Of
course, churches, synagogues, mosques, and other religious insti-
tutions could restrict marriage to heterosexual couples if they wish.
Marriage, as a religious sacrament, would thus be preserved in
whatever form a particular sect deems holy.
This remedy would be amenable to proponents as well as
opponents of gay marriage. For the proponents: the government
would have to treat heterosexual and homosexual couples equally,
conferring the same benefits upon all "union members." Also, both
gay and straight couples would be free to seek out religious
recognition of their union in the form of marriage. Religious clergy
would be able to officiate over same-sex marriages and sanction the
holy unions in the eyes of God (or whatever other spiritual entity a
180. In California beginning on January 1, 2005, registered domestic
partnerships were afforded the same legal protections and privileges that civil
marriages currently receive. Although California still does not allow same-sex
couples to take part in civil marriage ceremonies, the domestic partnership,
with the benefits of marriage, is available to gay couples. CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 297 (West 2005). Furthermore, to dissolve a domestic partnership, couples
must conduct divorce proceedings. To fully implement the proposed remedy,
all California must do now is convert existing civil marriages into civil unions,
and relinquish the institution of "marriage" to the religious organizations. See
Lee Romney, Though They Can't Wed, Gays May Now Divorce, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 1, 2005, at Al, ("The law's supporters and opponents agree that it makes
domestic partnership in California equivalent to marriage in almost all but
name.") available at http://www.latimes.com/news/locaI/la-me-domesticl
jan01,0,7970132.storycoll=la-home-headlines.
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particular religion might worship).
For the opponents: the status quo would remain-the
government would not have to recognize gay marriage (of course,
the government would not be recognizing any marriages, among
those, marriages between same-sex couples). People who oppose
homosexual relationships would never have to acknowledge gay
marriage; they could simply join a different church that comports
with their religious beliefs.
Public support for this solution as it pertains to same-sex couples
may be easier to attain than one would think. Even though a
majority of the public opposes gay marriage, a ma ority also
supports legal recognition of same-sex relationships. Further,
Bush's proposed constitutional amendment to ban gay marriage
would not preclude civil unions. Thus, conferring contractual rights
upon gay couples is not so radical.
What might be a bit harder for some to swallow is the idea that
civil marriage, as we currently know it by name, would no longer
exist. This idea, though, is not quite as extreme as it sounds. Again,
the benefits that civil marriage provides would remain available to
everyone, albeit listed under a new name in the tax code. Marriage,
of course, would still be alive and well (or at least as "well" as it is
now); it will merely have relocated. Instead of residing in city halls
and capitol buildings, marriage will return to where it began and
where it belongs--churches, synagogues, and mosques.
Questions might arise as to what would qualify as a civil union.
For couples seeking to enter into a civil union, Section 297 of the
California Family Code provides a useful guide. Section 297 lays
out how to establish a domestic partnership, California's version of a
civil union. Section 297 defines domestic partners as "two adults
who have chosen to share one another's lives in an intimate and
committed relationship of mutual caring."'182 It also sets forth the
following requirements for establishing such a partnership in
181. According to a poll conducted in July 2004, 28% of Americans
surveyed felt that gay couples should be allowed to legally marry, and 31%
supported civil unions (for a total of 59% support for gay rights). Only 38%
surveyed believed there should be no legal recognition of homosexual
relationships. CBS News/New York Times Poll, July 11-15, 2004 (N=955
adults nationwide) (MoE +/- 3 (total sample)), http://pollingreport.com/
civil.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2005).
182. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297 (West 2005).
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addition to filing a Declaration of Domestic Partnership with the
Secretary of State:
(1) Both persons have a common residence. (2) Neither
person is married to someone else or is a member of another
domestic partnership with someone else that has not been
terminated, dissolved, or adjudged a nullity. (3) The two
persons are not related by blood in a way that would
prevent them from being married to each other in this state.
(4) Both persons are at least 18 years of age. (5) Either of
the following: (A) Both persons are members of the same
sex. (B) One or both of the persons meet the eligibility
criteria under Title II of the Social Security Act [i.e., over
the age of sixty-two] .... (6) Both persons are capable of
consenting to the domestic partnership. 1
83
Although in California this provision only applies to same-sex
couples and heterosexual couples above the age of sixty-two, the
state legislature could easily adapt the criteria to define civil unions
for both heterosexual and homosexual couples alike. The reference
to marriage would disappear from the second element, but a
"domestic partnership" substitute is already in place. The third
element could be amended to read "The two persons are not related
by blood in the following degree: [the statute could list the degree of
relativity forbidden by the marriage laws referenced in this
element]." The fifth element above could be easily revised so that
"(B)" reads "the persons are members of the opposite sex," while
"(A)" remains the same. Thus, redefining civil unions would hardly
constitute an insurmountable task.
Dissolution of a civil union or domestic partnership would
remain unchanged. California dissolves marriages as well as domes-
tic partnerships through divorce.' 84  Divorce proceedings would
constitute a legal severance of the contractual relationship. Disso-
lution of a religious marriage would be handled through the religious
institution that ordained the union.
183. Id.
184. See Romney, supra note 180.
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V. CONCLUSION
Same-sex marriage is a volatile social issue that the Supreme
Court inevitably must confront. One approach the Court could take
would be to rely on Loving and subsequent Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence to resolve the debate on due process or equal
protection grounds. Although the outcome of this approach would
likely be favorable to proponents of same-sex marriage, the potential
public backlash from such a decision might dissuade the Justices
from expanding even a little on current case precedent. A more
fitting solution would require coming to terms with the fact that
marriage is, indeed, a religious institution-not a civil contract.
Nothing about this proposition is new. Why else would there be
such strong opposition to allowing gay couples to take part in a
"sacred," but not civil, event? No one seems to object to a gay
person entering into a contract to buy a car or to buy life insurance.
Tempers flare only when homosexuals seek to marry.
Because state-sponsored religious marriage intentionally favors
some religions while intentionally discriminating against others, it
runs afoul of the First Amendment. Using Loving as precedent for
eradicating government control over marriage, the First Amendment
can complete the story by providing a legal means to wholly
disestablish marriage from the public sphere.
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